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Abstract 
This essay argues that much of the contemporary confusion and controversy over the meaning 
and continuing utility of the concept of sovereignty stems from a failure to distinguish between 
sovereignty as a deep framing device for making sense of the modern legal and political word on 
the one hand, and the particular claims which are made on behalf of particular institutions, 
agencies, rules or other entities to possess sovereign authority on the other. The essay begins by 
providing a basic account of the difference between sovereignty as framing and sovereignty as 
claiming, setting out how, during the ascendancy of the modern state, the stability of the former 
is contrasted with the fluidity of the latter. It continues by analyzing why and how our 
understandings and uses of sovereignty have altered in the contemporary wave of globalization, 
with the very framing significance of sovereignty thrown into doubt. The essay argues, against 
that scepticism, for the continuing significance of the sovereignty frame in the global age. It 
concludes with some thoughts about the distinctive ways in which the evolving state of 
sovereignty framing and claiming plays out in the specific context of the United Kingdom and its 
external and internal legal and constitutional relations today. The resilient centrality of the 
doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty tends to collapse the distinction between the sovereignty 
frame and the sovereignty claim in the UK context, with certain reductive consequences for the 
structure and focus of constitutional debate in the UK. 
 
Keywords 
sovereignty, speech act, European Union, Parliamentary sovereignty, post-sovereignty, external 
sovereignty 
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Sovereignty Frames and Sovereignty Claims 
 
Neil Walker 
 
1. Introduction 
Why are we constantly “questioning sovereignty”?1 Why are we inclined to accuse sovereignty of 
“hypocrisy”2 or to reduce it to a “game”?3 Why are we concerned to “relocate”4 sovereignty or to 
search for its “fragments”?5 Why do we consider sovereignty to be “in transition”6, perhaps even 
in “in crisis”?7 Why do we feel ourselves in such danger of losing focus on sovereignty that we 
must strive, as in the present volume, to keep it ‘in perspective’?  Frankly, if  sovereignty is such 
trouble and if sovereignty is in such trouble – so incoherent, so illusory, so recondite, so 
degraded, so superannuated, so dispersed and diffuse – then why bother with it?  
                                                 
1
 N. MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty (Oxford: OUP, 1999). 
2
  S. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999). 
3
 R. Adler-Nissen and T. Gammeltoft-Hansen (eds) Sovereignty Games: Instrumentalizing State Sovereignty in 
Europe and Beyond (New York: Palgrave, 2008). 
4
 N. Walker (ed) Relocating Sovereignty (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 2006). 
5
 H. Kalmo and Q. Skinner (eds) Sovereignty in Fragments: The Past, Present and Future of a Contested Concept 
(Cambridge: CUP, 2010). 
6
 N. Walker (ed) Sovereignty in Transition (Oxford: Hart, 2003) 
7
 J. Fischer,  “Europe’s Sovereignty Crisis” Social Europe Journal; 02/08/11  http://www.social-
europe.eu/2011/08/europes-sovereignty-crisis/ 
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The reason, I believe, is actually quite straightforward, though its detailed explanation 
quickly becomes quite complicated. Sovereignty has long held a dual significance in legal 
thought. It has been part of the deep and often taken-for-granted conceptual structure through 
which law is authorised and organized as law and in terms of which we are able to conceive of 
legal order in general. Yet it has also been the label invoked by, attributed to, or claimed on 
behalf of a wide range of different actors, entities and mechanisms associated with the legal and 
political architecture of the state and of inter-state relations. That is to say, sovereignty has 
inhabited both the silent (and relatively still) depths and the vocal (and relatively volatile) 
surfaces of legal thought. It has supplied a stable frame through which the legal world as a whole 
is apprehended and shaped
8
 as well as the discursive form of a claim variously and sometimes 
speculatively or contentiously made in respect of a state, a federal province, a nation, a people, a 
supra-state, a constitution, a constitutive rule or rule-set, a governmental complex or a specific 
institution of government or governance.  
Sovereignty, therefore, has always been a concept as fundamental as it is contentious, as 
difficult to give up as it is to pin down. Today, however, there is something of a shift in both 
registers of sovereignty – in sovereignty as frame as well as sovereignty as claim. In each case 
this shift is associated with the gradual decentring of the state within the global matrix of legal 
and political authority. On the one hand, as the basic idea of sovereignty has been closely bound 
up with the form of the modern state, it is unsurprising that the challenge posed by the forces of 
globalization to the dominant centrality of the modern state form has also led to greater 
questioning of sovereignty even at the level of deep structure. On the other hand, the more 
                                                 
8
  See e.g. R. Jackson, “Sovereignty in World Politics: A Glance at the Conceptual and Historical Landscape” (1999) 
67 Political Studies 431-456. 
University of Edinburgh School of Law Research Paper No. 2013/14 
Page 3 of 26 
 
diverse and densely interconnected institutional and regulatory architecture of a less state-centred 
world also challenges our understanding - already less settled and more fragile at this level - of 
where and how, if at all, specific sovereignty claims may be persuasively articulated and 
vindicated.   
Sovereignty as frame and sovereignty as claim alike, therefore, occupy a more precarious 
position today than they did in the period of high political modernity ushered in by the late 18th 
century constitutional settlements in the United States and France. But it is hardly a more 
marginal position, for the very factors that challenge the centrality or appropriateness of the 
sovereignty paradigm also provide the occasion for its re-emphasis. If sovereignty is one of the 
very building blocks of modern legal thought and organization, then it cannot lightly be 
discarded; its vulnerability, therefore, is as likely to provoke efforts towards its reassertion or 
refinement as towards its abandonment. Equally, the increasing fluidity and interconnectedness 
of governmental relations, which challenges particular claims to sovereignty and complicates 
their assessment, also provides a fertile field for new claims to sovereignty or the refinement of 
old claims.  The very factors that make sovereignty an increasingly troubled and troubling 
concept, in other words, also serve to intensify efforts and to extend opportunities to resort to it.  
  In what follows, I begin by providing a basic account of the difference between 
sovereignty as framing and sovereignty as claiming, setting out how, during the ascendancy of 
the modern state, the stability of the former has contrasted with the fluidity of the latter. I 
continue by analyzing why and how this has changed in the contemporary wave of globalization.  
I conclude with some brief remarks about  the distinctive ways in which the evolving state of 
sovereignty framing and claiming plays out in the specific context of the United Kingdom and of 
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its external and internal legal and constitutional relations today.  How do ‘sovereignty as frame’ 
and ‘sovereignty as claim’ continue to structure the British constitution, for better or for worse? 
2. The Sovereignty Frame 
Our modern notion of sovereignty derives from the medieval figure of the sovereign - the 
ruler who holds absolute authority over his subjects and who is under no legal obligation to any 
higher power.
9
 The figure of the sovereign already involved a process of abstraction - the King 
possessing a 'politic body or capacity' in addition to his 'natural body'.
10
  Gradually, as the early 
modern sovereign sought or acquired more extensive and more intensive resources and 
responsibilities of government, the abstract quality of the office became more pronounced.  Both 
the ruler and the ruled became more formalized and detached categories. Sovereignty came to 
acquire its mature sense, referring to the existence of a singular ruling power, however 
institutionalized and internally differentiated, in which inheres final and absolute authority over 
the political community as a whole.  Sovereignty thus understood as an ideal of indivisible but 
impersonal authority, as developed by early modern thinkers such as Grotius, Bodin and Hobbes, 
resolved two key problems that had confounded mediaeval political theory. Authority no longer 
needed to be concentrated in the hands of the one or the few in order to be considered a unity. 
Equally, its separation from a particular personage or personal office allowed for its continuity 
over space and time.
11
  
                                                 
9
  See e.g.  M.Loughlin Foundations of Public Law (Oxford: OUP, 2010) ch.7. 
10
 Calvin’s case (1608) 7 Co Rep 1 10a, per Coke CJ. 
11
  See e.g.  J. Bertelson “On the Indivisibility of Sovereignty” (2011) 2(2) Republics of Letters. A Journal for the 
Study of Knowledge, Politics and the Arts http://arcade.stanford.edu/journals/rofl/articles/on-indivisibility-
sovereignty-by-jens-bartelson 
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The development of this more encompassing conception of sovereignty also begins to 
account for sovereignty’s Janus-faced quality in the modern order – its simultaneous reference to 
the internal relations of the state polity and to its external relations. Let us recall that, as distinct 
from the overlapping and interlocking pattern of authority among dynastically sovereign, 
imperial, clerical, feudal and other forms that was characteristic of mediaeval authority, modern 
sovereignty denotes the finality, comprehensive remit and indivisibility of the ruling power 
within a territory. It follows that modern sovereignty’s interior and exterior dimensions become 
closely mutually conditioned and enabled. For the monopolistic authority of a state within its 
territory to be achieved and maintained, recognition from other polities and their commitment to 
non-interference was necessary.  Equally, for states to exercise their external sovereignty as 
actors capable of entering into international legal commitments, the indivisibility and finality of 
their internal authority was required.
12
 
How might we summarize the significance of this profound shift from pre-modern to 
modern understandings of sovereign authority? In general terms, we may consider the deep 
structure of the emergent sovereignty frame along two dimensions.
13
 In the first place, and most 
fundamentally, there is an epistemic shift. Sovereignty in its mature form consists of a new 
“social imaginary”14 – a novel way of knowing and ordering the world that “silently frames the 
                                                 
12
  On the self-conscious linkage of internal and external sovereignty in the making of the United States, see D. 
Armitage, The Declaration of Independence: A Global History (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007). 
13
  See N. Walker “The Variety of Sovereignty” in Sovereignty Games n3 above, 21-32; see also N. Walker 
“Introduction” in Relocating Sovereignty n4 above, xi-xxi. 
14
 C. Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004). 
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conduct of much of modern politics.”15  Sovereignty’s mature frame is first and foremost a 
presuppositional frame that shapes perception, understanding and, in turn, practical reason. It   
involves the constructive assumption of an ultimately authoritative “unity (out) of a manifold”16 
It is a representational and ordering device which envisages and identifies discrete polities that 
can act in the name of an undifferentiated collective notwithstanding an internal diversity of 
interests, values and wills. Importantly, as Martin Loughlin has argued,
17
 in this deep framing 
sense sovereignty is conceptually prior both to positive law, including constitutional law, and to 
the governmental and wider political system, and does not necessarily privilege either. Like 
politics, law, or at least the domain of public law,
18
 is predicated upon sovereignty. The security 
of law’s commitments, its construction of a bounded order, its durability and its expansive 
capacity for reflexive self-reproduction, are all dependent on the axiomatic frame of sovereign 
power.  
Secondly, the mature age of sovereignty also involves a systemic shift. International 
relations theorists tend to talk in the language of ‘system’ – as in the ‘system of states’ or the 
‘Westphalian system’.19   The template of mature sovereignty, with its symbiotically related 
                                                 
15
 Jackson, n8 above, 431. 
16
  H. Lindahl “Sovereignty and Symbolization” (1997) 28 Rechtstheorie 347-371, 348. 
17
  See e.g. M. Loughlin “In Defence of Staatslehre” (2009) 48   Der Staat 1-28. See also Loughlin, Foundations of 
Public Law n9 above. 
18
  For discussion of alternative historical frames for the modern legal universe (in whole or in part), in particular the 
fluid tradition of ‘common law(s)’, see P. Glenn On Common Laws (Oxford: OUP, 2005). See also N. Walker “On 
the Necessary Publicness of Law” in  C. Michelon, G. Clunie, C. McCorkindale and H. Psarras (eds) The Public in 
Law (Aldershot: Ashgate,2012) 7-33 
19
  See e.g. R. Jackson, n8 above. 
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internal and external aspects, presupposes and requires a general type rather than a unique 
instance. It imagines a world of sovereign states, mutually recognizing, mutually supportive and 
mutually exclusive in their claims to the plenitude of internal authority. That is to say, mature 
sovereignty can only be understood in a systemic context, sustained through a path-dependent 
and self-reproductive cycle of formally identical polities operating according to certain uniform 
norms of engagement. 
 Of course, the ‘real world’ is much different from this idealized world of international 
law and relations, and always has been. The sovereign system in the high modern age was a 
partial and precarious accomplishment, denied to many conquered or aspiring peoples in the 
name of empire or the self-interest of the already self-chosen, and more generally vulnerable to 
state aggression in a global system then as now lacking any central monopoly of legitimate 
violence. Yet, the systemic dimension obtained sufficient purchase – enough of a ‘framing effect’ 
– to provide a powerful and sustained logic of reproduction in global political relations. 
3. The Sovereignty Claim 
Jean Bodin famously spoke of the “marks of sovereignty”20 to convey the idea that modern 
sovereignty in its abstract and encompassing sense possesses no singular phenomenal form, but 
instead is made visible or perceptible to us through its diverse manifestations. The construction 
of a unity out of the manifold that is so vital to the deep epistemic frame of sovereignty is and 
cannot but be an artificial unity, one which is only empirically observed and reconstituted 
                                                 
20
  J. Bodin, The Six Books of a Commonweale [1576: Richard Knolles trans. 1606] (Cambridge, Harvard University 
Press, 1962) Book1, Chapter 10. 
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through “scattered signs.”21 These marks and signs are not self-evident or self-selecting.  They 
are a matter of active construction and reception, and beneath, before and after that construction 
and reception may lie speculation and disagreement, struggle and contention, endorsement and 
rejection of any particular site and image of sovereign power.  
The invocation of sovereignty, in other words, involves a “speech act”22   possessing not only 
locutionary and illocutionary force but also perlocutionary force. That is to say, sovereignty 
claims are not merely utterances conveying a set meaning, but have real and variable effects on 
social and political practice through persuading, threatening, enlightening, inspiring or otherwise 
shaping behaviour or expectations. These effects are inseparable from the history of a particular 
set of sovereign arrangements and the constellation of meaning associated with that history. The 
British idea of the Queen-in-Parliament, the historical French attachment to the dual notions of 
national sovereignty and popular sovereignty, and the importance of the residual ‘sovereign' 
powers of the states as consecrated in the 10
th
 Amendment of the American Constitution, for 
example,  all refer to quite different marks of sovereignty which only make sense in their own 
particular context. Yet each speaks to the distribution of the same underlying unity of sovereign 
power, and each shows sovereignty at the symbolic level to be of a deeply ideological character - 
a vehicle through which meaning is constructed to shape and allocate power.  
In expressive terms, therefore, sovereignty is a ‘virtual’ category, one that has no phenomenal 
presence in its capacious entirety and so must always and can only manifest itself through 
                                                 
21
  D. Baranger, “The Apparition of Sovereignty” in Kalmo and Skinner (eds) n5 above 47-63, 53. 
22
 W.G. Werner and J. H. De Wilde “The Endurance of Sovereignty” (2001) 7 European Journal of International 
Relations 283-313, 287. 
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iterative and more-or-less creative symbolic acts of representation.
23
 This symbolic work, 
sometimes speculative or contentious in its claims, may involve either, in the one direction, 
specification of the detailed framework of operationalization and application of sovereignty; or, 
in the other direction, the identification of its source or pedigree.  That is to say, it may involve, 
in the former more concrete vein, claims to the rightful possession or appropriate articulation of  
some or all aspects of the sovereign power on behalf of particular institutional forms or 
regulatory complexes  – legislative, executive or judicial organs or some combination of these, 
federated levels of government, constitutive instruments etc. Or it may involve, in the latter more 
abstract vein, the “imputation” of the ‘true’ seat or source of sovereign power to other ‘virtual’ 
entities themselves capable of being made apparent only through representation,  such as 'the 
people'  or 'the nation.'
24
  
It is unsurprising that sovereignty in its expressive dimension is used to such various and 
open-ended effect. Its wide range of reference is not just the obverse, but also the price of its 
underlying unity, and a reflection of the importance of the ideological stakes involved. 
According to the prominent French constitutional scholar Carré de Malberg, moreover, the 
unwieldy range of the sovereignty term, and the consequent danger of conceptual confusion, is 
exacerbated by the lack of sufficient discrimination in our natural language.
25
 And what is the 
case for French also applies in English. Unlike the German language, for example, both French 
and English use the ‘s’ word to refer not only to the supreme ordering power in the deep framing 
                                                 
23
 See, Lindahl note 16 above. 
24
 See e.g.  M. Troper “The Survival of Sovereignty” in Kalmo and Skinner (eds) n5 above, 132-150, 147. 
25
 Paris: Dalloz, 2 Vols, 2004) Vol. 1 79. 
University of Edinburgh School of Law Research Paper No. 2013/14 
Page 10 of 26 
 
sense considered above – which is the only meaning of Souveranitat in German -  but, in 
addition,  to both the entire range of powers embraced within the state’s authority (Staatsgewalt) 
and the power of the highest organ of state authority (Herrschaft).    
We should not, however, overstate the indeterminacy of the claim-language of sovereignty.  
It is far from true that ‘anything goes’ in the bidding war over what counts as a sovereignty mark.  
Claims to sovereignty are more or less compelling and their persuasiveness depends, amongst 
other things, upon the embedded familiarity of their invocation in their immediate symbolic 
context, or the persuasiveness of their asserted or implied resemblance to or analogy with other 
contexts of use, as well as the plausibility of their corroboration of existing architectures of 
authority. For example, one standard version of "foundational constitutionalism"
26
 typically 
invokes sovereignty as a recurrent link in an extended chain of authority. Sovereignty may, as in 
the American version of the foundational constitutional story, appear in one and the same 
narrative in various guises and iterations -   as the collective will and constituent power of the 
people or nation, as the spirit animating and authorizing the basic form of a written constitution, 
as a quality imbuing some of the organs named in the written constitution, and as a remainder or 
residual power left to other constitutional actors. Other constitutional heritages possess their own 
variations on this conventional symbolical wisdom,
27
 but in all cases the marks of sovereignty 
tend to fit together in patterns whose intelligibility and acceptability turns on their clear 
                                                 
26
  See e.g.  N. Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism: The Pluralist Structure of Postnational Law (Oxford: OUP, 2010) 
ch.2. 
27
 For discussion of the main modern constitutional traditions, including their use of sovereignty discourse, see M. 
Rosenfeld, The Identity of the Constitutional Subject: Selfhood, Citizenship, Culture and Community  (New York, 
Routledge, 2009)  
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resonance with a dominant narrative of political authority current in that polity or more 
generally. 
4. Sovereignty in a post-Westphalian Age 
If the high modern world emphasized 'sovereign' comprehensiveness of authority, 
universality of form and mutual exclusivity of claims, our late modern world in which the 
continuing adequacy of sovereignty as a framing and claiming device stands to be assessed looks 
quite different. While the state remains the focus of political organization - and its continuing 
prominence is one reason why talk of a return to a medieval configuration is inaccurate - the 
state is now merely first amongst equals. In place of a universal and uniform template of 
sovereign statehood we have a highly differentiated European and, indeed, global "mosaic"
28
 of 
legal and political capacities. In place of internal sovereignty as comprehensive and 
monopolistic, authority is typically partial – distributed between various political sites and levels, 
states and otherwise. And in place of mutual exclusivity as the default condition of external 
sovereignty, we have overlap, interlock and mutual interference. 
How so? No single factor explains the gradual and continuing movement from 
universality, comprehensiveness and mutual exclusivity to differentiation, partiality and overlap. 
Rather, there is a combination and accumulation of forces. Some tendencies challenge states and 
their borders as effective containers of power. The long post-Second World War development of 
transnational markets, communication media and cultural forms gradually eroded the material 
capacity of the nation state as the axis of economic power and political authority, and, to a lesser 
                                                 
28
  See e.g., N. Walker, J. Shaw and S. Tierney (eds) Europe’s Constitutional Mosaic (Oxford: Hart, 2011).  For 
discussion of sovereign-like forms in the wider global mosaic, see e.g. J.L. Dunoff and J. Trachman (eds) Ruling the 
World? Constitutionalism, International Law and Global Governance  (Cambridge, CUP, 2009). 
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extent, its symbolic locus as the core of political identity. Institutional responses to these changes 
underscored the state-decentring trend. Globally inclusive entities  such as the United Nations 
and exclusive groupings  such as the G8,  as well as regional institutions like the EU,  both 
tracked and reinforced the development of forms of collective action and public goods (and 
'bads') beyond the state. Their remit ranges far and wide, from the provision of security to the 
protection of human rights, and from the making of transnational markets to market-‘correction’ 
in spheres as diverse as food safety, environmental protection, energy efficiency and criminal 
justice co-operation. Overlapping  these umbrella institutions there is a dense network of 
powerful, functionally specialist transnational organizations, from state-controlled public bodies 
such as the World Trade Organisation and the International Atomic Energy Agency, through  
hybrid public/private entities such as the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, 
to purely non-state organs such as the International Olympic Committee.
29
 To repeat, none of 
these changes implies that the sovereign state is redundant. They simply generate new and 
supplementary tiers of transnationally connected legal and political authority, in so doing 
challenging the generality of the framework of state authority. Particular states retain 
considerable power, though, tellingly, these tend to be of a size or regional prominence – 
whether the United States or newly emergent regional powers such as Brazil, Russia, India and 
China – that allows them to operate on the same global scale as many of the new transnational 
entities.  
                                                 
29
 For discussion, see for example N. Walker “Postnational Constitutionalism and Postnational Public Law: A Tale 
of Two Neologisms” (2012) 3 Transnational Legal Theory 61-86. 
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But the challenge to state sovereignty is not simply a matter of the emergence of a higher 
scale of authority. Alongside these global and transnational tendencies, other disturbances to the 
sovereignty of the state emanate from below.
30
 Ironically, the seeds of this challenge to the 
modem system were sown in the foundational American settlement of 1789. As well as the first 
constitutionally baptized modern state, the United States was also the first mature federation. It 
gave novel constitutional form to the idea of territorially distributed power within the polity. 
However, it did so in a way which - even if it required a Civil War to settle the matter 
definitively - understood the allocation of jurisdiction between federal government and 
provincial or 'state' institutions as an expression of the sovereign authority of the United States as 
an integrated whole rather than as a challenge to the very idea of a sovereign frame.
31
  
Federalism US-style was designed and rolled out in a particular way, involving a clear 
division between the two levels of authority and their respective policy spheres, a high degree of 
ethnic or cultural homogeneity between the different state units, and uniform and symmetrical 
legal and institutional treatment of these units. Contemporary federalism, or quasi-federalism, 
has gradually diverged from that classical norm. Most newer federations, such as Germany, are 
‘co-operative' rather than 'dual' arrangements, involving a significant degree of policy overlap 
and institutional  interlocking  between central and local levels. Many, such as Canada, Spain or 
Belgium, with our own “Union State”32 as an untidy outlier even of this sub-category of quasi-
                                                 
30
  See e.g.  S. Tierney “Reframing Sovereignty? Sub-State National Societies and Contemporary Challenges to the 
Nation-State” (2005) 54 International and Comparative Legal Quarterly 161-83. 
31
  On the relationship between a fragmented notion of internal sovereignty and a unitary notion of external 
sovereignty in the United States, see R. Keohane, “Ironies of Sovereignty: The European Union and the United 
States” (2002) 40 Journal of Common Market Studies 743-65. 
32
  See S. Rokkan and D. Urwin The Politics of Territorial Identity: Studies in European Regionalism (London:  
Sage, 1982).  
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federations, are also multinational or multiethnic rather than merely territorial compacts, with 
some constituencies retaining aspirations towards stronger forms of constitutional recognition. 
And such multinational or multiethnic federations tend, in addition, towards uneven or 
asymmetrical treatment of their provinces; those with the clearest or most longstanding traditions 
of distinctiveness, or the strongest claim to national identity, are accorded more ample 
recognition of cultural goods such as language or religion, greater regional governmental 
autonomy, or disproportionate influence at the federal centre. All these factors combine to create 
a looser and more fluid political form, challenging the earlier conception of the federal state as a 
mere variation of the sovereigntist ideal of a well ordered and permanently settled unity.
33
 
So when considering the overall challenge to the universality, comprehensiveness and 
mutual exclusivity of the modern  system  of modern states and its sovereigntist frame, we must 
look to both flanks -  to pressures from the substate interior as well as from the transnational 
beyond. Furthermore, the two dynamics feed off one another. Claims to substate national 
recognition or protection are powerfully sponsored through global and regional mechanisms for 
the promotion of individual or collective rights, while supranational institutions such as the EU 
provide a scale of policy and economic support which makes the ambition of greater regional 
autonomy within existing states more viable. By the same token, just because existing states have 
gradually ceded authority and capacity upwards to other territorial or functional institutions, they 
may become less attractive magnets for substate nations and less well equipped to maintain their 
sovereign integrity.
34
 
                                                 
33
  See e.g.  S. Choudry (ed) Constitutional Design for Divided Societies: Integration or Accommodation? (Oxford: 
OUP, 2008) 
34
 Se e.g. Tierney n30 above; see more generally S. Tierney Constitutional Law and National Pluralism (Oxford: 
OUP, 2006); M. Keating Stateless Nations: Plurinational Democracy in a Post-Sovereignty Era (Oxford: OUP, 
2004). 
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In all of this, it is evident how the challenge to the high modern paradigm of sovereignty 
gathers pace.  The development of new and unfamiliar forms and sites of authority alongside and 
often interlocking with the state means that the expressive language of sovereignty is no longer 
so clearly suited to  the  ‘marks’  of our global institutional architecture, many parts of which bear 
only a tenuous relationship to anything resembling a unitary polity. Systemically too, these new 
forms and combinations of authority disturb the self-reproductive cycle of sovereign mutual 
exclusion and recognition. And the fundamental question whether the sovereigntist world-view, 
with its predilection to picture legal authority as a plurality of unities, is even epistemically 
adequate to the task of providing a basic grid for the changing world order, is posed ever more 
insistently and challengingly. 
In earlier work, I sought to address and answer this challenge by resort to the idea of "late 
sovereignty."
35
 Late sovereignty is still sovereignty and so remains connected to the modernist 
paradigm to the extent that sovereignty language and its associated ideas of ultimate authority 
continue to be used across existing states, and indeed, are increasingly endorsed across other 
non-state sites of political or legal community, whether in sub-national contexts or in 
supranational or transnational contexts such as the EU or the WTO.   Yet late sovereignty is both 
a distinctive and, probably, an irreversible phase in the history of modern sovereignty. It is 
distinctive in the sense that the claim to authority as flowing from and through some underlying 
unity is no longer combined with the notion that it need be monopolistic within the territorial 
boundaries of the polity. Rather, what we observe, for example, in the relations of the EU to its 
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  N. Walker “Late Sovereignty in the European Union” in Walker (ed) n6 above 3-32. For a recent refinement and 
application, See C. MacAmhlaigh, “Late Sovereignty in post-integration Europe: Continuity and change in a 
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member states, each of which makes sovereigntist or supremacy-based claims in respect of the 
other,
36
 is an emerging sense of “autonomy without territorial exclusivity”.37  In turn, this break 
in the connection between ultimate authority and exclusivity of authority undermines the 
systemic conservatism of the older matrix. If the  power of any and each sovereign entity is no 
longer conditioned by an attitude of mutual forbearance and recognition on the part of all such 
entities, then, in a  self-reinforcing fashion,  the system as a whole becomes less  resistant against 
new claims and new mutations of sovereignty. This structural shift is reflected and reinforced at 
the level of the sociology of political power. Non-state political forms may have been the 
creation of sovereign states, but over time they become much more than the sum of their 
antecedents and may transcend the conditions of their formation. Particular non-state polities 
may come and go – in 2013 we can no longer even be sure that the world’s most advanced non-
state polity, the EU, will survive in recognizable form. Yet given the continuing economic, 
technological, cultural and institutional forces of transnationalism, and given continuing 
indication of the pliability of the sovereign form, the possibility of rewinding to an age of high 
modernity in which no non-state juridical entity challenges the exclusive authority of the state 
seems remote. 
But if the logic of sovereignty is no longer one of conservative reproduction but of 
variable reiteration, will we not in time arrive at a tipping point where sovereignty loses its grip 
as a plausible way of imagining and adjusting our global political arrangements? Will we not 
reach a stage where states are so qualified and compromised in their internal and external 
normative authority, yet non-state entities are so deficient or otherwise unfamiliar in terms of our 
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  See e.g. M. Claes, The National Courts’ Mandate in the European Constitution (Oxford: Hart, 2006) 
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  Walker, n35 above, 23. See also the chapter by Chalmers in this volume. 
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conventional template of the sovereign polity, that sovereignty no longer serves as a viable frame 
for the whole? Even to pose the question raises three related imponderables, and it is our 
inability to resolve these imponderables which should makes us unwilling to ‘wish away’ our 
sovereigntist frame. 
A first imponderable is starkly empirical. We cannot predict the course of global history, 
and so cannot tell whether the trend away from the state system may nevertheless re-stabilize in a 
new equilibrium. Secondly, for the same reason we cannot predict or control for the degree of 
latent flexibility in the language and presuppositions of sovereignty. Thirdly, we cannot easily 
answer the relevant counterfactual question; namely, if there is a sovereignty-shaped hole 
emerging in our understanding of the legal and political universe, how do we begin to conceive 
of an alternative matrix of political agency? For sovereignty will not fade and become irrelevant 
in a conceptual vacuum, but only to the extent that such an alternative emerges and ‘catches on’. 
Yet precisely because we still tend to think, however implicitly, within a sovereigntist frame and 
perspective, we lack the means to assess how likely the emergence of such an alternative 
paradigm might be or what shape it might take. 
But what of those, such as Neil MacCormick, who have nevertheless confidently hailed 
the end of sovereignty?
38
 It is surely instructive that in so doing they have tended to concentrate 
on surfaces rather than depths, institutional appearances rather than formative premises, claims 
rather than frames. It is undeniable, and well-illustrated by MacCormick, that governmental 
power, whether in federations, or in our own Union state, or at supranational sites, or in 
international contexts, tends to be divided, pooled, shared or otherwise redistributed in ever more 
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novel and manifold ways. But the logic of modern sovereignty has always depended upon the 
contrast and facilitative relationship between underlying unity of form and diversity of 
application, and indeed the energy of modern sovereign power lies in the versatile and renewable 
capacity of the former to prompt and contain the latter. It simply begs the question, therefore, to 
point to an unprecedented pattern of institutional diversity as evidence of sovereignty’s broken 
unity. 
 
5. The Changing UK Context: Parliamentary Sovereignty and its Reductions  
As later essays in this volume make abundantly clear,
39
 discussion of sovereignty in the British 
context continues to be dominated by the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty.
40
 It naturally 
follows that contemporary British debate over the challenge to sovereignty in general  should  
also focus on the ways in which Parliamentary sovereignty in particular has recently been 
subjected to new threats, provocations  and qualifications.  The questioning of Parliamentary 
sovereignty, which in its canonical Diceyan version holds that Parliament can make and unmake 
any law and that no other body can override or set aside its legislation, has come from quite 
different corners of the legal universe.
41
 The integrity of the doctrine is challenged from the 
perspective of European Union law and its own self-understanding as a supreme and self-
contained legal order. It is interrogated through the prism of the Human Rights Act 1998 and, in 
particular, its strong section 3(1) direction to interpret statute in conformity with the rights 
contained in the European Convention on Human Rights. It is also queried from the standpoint of 
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40
  See, e.g., the classic studies of J Goldsworthy; The Sovereignty of Parliament: History and Philosophy (Oxford, 
OUP, 1999); Parliamentary Sovereignty: Contemporary Debates (Cambridge, CUP, 2010). 
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 For a good overview, see A. W. Bradley “The Sovereignty of Parliament: Form or Substance?”  (Oxford: OUP, 
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the UK’s constituent nations – for a long time Ireland and, more recently, Scotland, with Wales 
some way behind - and their claim, buttressed by the recent growth of devolved systems of 
government, to possess or develop their own seat of sovereign authority.
42
   
Closely bound up with these challenges, a more general scepticism towards the 
Parliamentary sovereignty doctrine as an unqualified attribution of power to the institutional 
complex of the Queen-in-Parliament has recently gained a firm foothold within both academic 
and judicial circles.  We are advised from a position of “common law constitutionalism”43  - or, 
perhaps more accurately, “common law radicalism”44 - that the role of the courts in providing the 
last legal word on the meaning of the constitution is no mere institutional inference. It is  not  
simply that, as the branch of government concerned with interpretation and application in 
disputed instances, they have an unavoidable voice in  the recognition and mobilization of our 
constitutional fundamentals, and in using that voice should do no more than passively 
acknowledge and register the political fact of Parliamentary sovereignty. Rather, the enduring 
involvement of the courts is deemed to have a more profound significance. It indicates that 
Parliamentary sovereignty is itself a dual or “bi-polar”45 principle, or a common law rule of a 
                                                 
42
 See e.g. MacCormick n1 above, chs 11 and 12; M. Keating, The Independence of Scotland (Oxford: OUP, 2009). 
The continuing power of the sovereignty metaphor is vividly demonstrated by the tone and content of the Scottish 
Government’s recent document setting out its timetable for constitutional change in view of the referendum on 
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(2009) 22 Cambridge Law Journal  187 - 203 
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  See e.g.  C Turpin and A Tomkins, British Government and the Constitution (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
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kind that is open to refinement or qualification by the judges.  In turn, this power of qualification, 
as has been suggested in a number of recent cases,
46
 may enable, indeed oblige, the judges to 
impose certain substantive constraints in the name of the Rule of Law or a more general 
attachment to a principled rather than a policy-based foundation for legal rules.
47
 In this broader 
movement, the challenge to a Westminster-centred concentration of power from Brussels, from 
Strasbourg and from the Celtic nations is understood both as an opportunity and as a reason to 
rethink an old doctrine for new times. 
How does this distinctive developmental track fit with our general understanding of 
sovereignty as providing a dual significance in legal thought – as concerned both with framing 
and with claiming? Most strikingly, what we observe in the British context, through the 
telescoping of the sovereignty debate onto the institutional complex of the Queen-in-Parliament, 
is a tendency to elide or blur the very distinction between the underlying frame and the sovereign 
mark which I have sought to emphasize. In a nutshell, Parliamentary sovereignty tends to be 
approached   less as a sign of sovereignty than as the thing itself.  Let me conclude by suggesting 
why and how this tendency occurs, and outlining some of its consequences.  
This is not the place to rehearse the history of Parliament and its struggle with the Crown, 
and how this struggle was won over the course of the 17th century and consolidated in the 18th 
century.
48
 It suffices to say that the early success of Parliamentary sovereignty, at a point where 
the full conceptual apparatus of modern constitutionalism was not yet in place, shaped and 
constrained the way in which ideas of ultimate authority could be imagined and pursued within 
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 See in particular, Robinson v  Secretary of State for Northern Ireland [2002] UKHL 32 (HL)( Lord Bingham and 
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the British polity. If we recall the history of sovereignty as one of progressive abstraction from 
the personal,   dynastic and singular to the impersonal, corporate and internally differentiated, the 
idea of Parliamentary sovereignty occupies a midpoint on this continuum. Only with the 
development of  foundational constitutional settlements in the late 18th century was  the  
distinction  between sovereignty in general - now seen as an attribute of ‘the people’ as 
constituent power - and its  particular institutional manifestations and applications fully 
developed and clarified in political theory and symbology. The English and later the British state 
was in this regard a case of arrested development. The part became the whole, the surrogate the 
original, the application the source.  
Other ideas of sovereignty did of course emerge or were preserved alongside 
Parliamentary sovereignty, both in terms of pedigree and institutionalization.  On the one hand, 
in terms of pedigree, an alternative and in some measure complementary tradition of popular 
sovereignty grew and persisted alongside parliamentary sovereignty
49
 without ever receiving the 
endorsement of a constitutional moment of self-founding or otherwise achieving widespread 
recognition as the dominant source of constitutional legitimacy. On the other hand, in terms of 
institutionalization – and indeed providing one of the counterpoints to the idea of popular 
sovereignty - even after the struggles of the 17
th
 century the Crown retained a residual final 
authority apart from Parliament. This was particularly evident in the persistence of prerogative 
powers, but also as one dimension of the resilient authority of the courts and, perhaps,  one 
remote form of corroboration of the contemporary  revival of the judicial claim to co-
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sovereignty.
50
  Yet throughout, Parliament continued to provide the magnetic centre of the 
constitutional order, its assertion of sovereignty supplying the  symbolic and authoritative point 
of reference and limiting condition for other claims, both innovatory and renovatory.  
This narrow vision of sovereignty supplied many advantages of institutional unity, and in 
time, of democratic focus. Indeed, much of the force of the contemporary case for the United 
Kingdom as a distinctively "political constitution",
51
 as one more responsive to the will of the 
legislature than to the reason of doctrine, depends on that vision of sovereignty. But narrowness 
of outlook and concentration of institutional authority also has a downside, not least its failure to 
unpack sovereignty into a fuller constitutional vision. In particular, the 'single mark' of 
Parliamentary sovereignty has always occupied the space and pre-empted the adoption of just 
that constitutional framework of higher law which would allow a popular designation and 
broaden distribution of the marks of sovereignty. Instead, concentrated in the single institutional 
complex of the Queen-in-Parliament, the domain of sovereignty becomes a congested zone. This 
has a number of challenging consequences. From its narrow point of ultimate authority 
Parliamentary sovereignty tends to be conceptually overburdened as our constitutional lodestar, 
to be competed over as a prize rather than treated as a common resource of constitutional 
authority, and to invite a backward-looking rather than a forward-looking approach to 
constitutional construction and justification.  Let us briefly examine each of these related 
tendencies. 
First there is the question of conceptual overload. There are many examples of the 
reductive and distorting effect of too narrow a focus on Parliamentary sovereignty. Take, for 
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instance, the matter of statutory interpretation. Until recent years, the idea that the first and only 
responsibility of the Courts was to give effect to the intention of Parliament had the effect of 
chilling meaningful discussion of the nature and purpose of the judicial role in areas where 
statute offered insufficient guidance or might even be absent – notably in human rights cases and 
in judicial review of administrative action. Indeed, some of the early success of a common law 
constitutionalist approach is owed to its candid approach to the insufficiency of existing 
protocols of judicial interpretation and the inordinate weight these placed on the narrow principle 
of Parliamentary sovereignty.
52
 
 Or take, for example, the question of Britain’s relationship with the European Union. In 
most constitutional orders, internal sovereignty - the location of ultimate authority within the 
polity - and external sovereignty - the authority of the polity as a whole in relation to the rest of 
the world - are clearly concerned with distinct aspects. This is often reflected in a written 
Constitution, where different provisions will deal with the internal allocation of authority 
amongst the branches and levels of government on the one hand, and external relations on the 
other, including the place of international law, supranational law or other forms of foreign law 
vis-à-vis domestic law in the hierarchy of sources of law-making.53 In the British case, however, 
there is no such clear distinction between internal and external sovereignty and their limits, at 
least as regards legislative authority.
54
 Accordingly, the question of the standing of European 
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 For an enduringly excellent statement of the legal and political circumstances of the early growth of common law 
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Union law, which by encroaching on many areas of domestic authority curtails the international 
legal sovereignty of the United Kingdom, is treated in the same perspective, and as part of the 
same stream of constitutional reasoning and judicial authority, as any internal challenge to the 
sovereign location of power from the perspective, say, of human rights or the devolution of 
power.
55
 Parliamentary sovereignty is treated as a single reference point and conceptual prism for 
internal and external relations alike, even though the stakes are quite different – the proper 
distribution and self-imposed  limits of internal legislative authority on the one hand, and the 
balance of UK authority with Europe and the world on the other.  Again, the reduction of the 
whole to the part, the idea to one of its manifestations, has a cramping effect on constitutional 
language and thought.  Parliamentary sovereignty is in danger of having to explain and justify 
too much and to collapse different questions into a single answer. 
Secondly, there is the prize-fighting dimension. If sovereignty in the British constitution 
exists only or predominantly through its Parliamentary mark, then the key to constitutional 
authority and the realization of any particular vision of the constitutional good  lies in control of  
the meaning or operationalization of that mark. The reason why disagreements between different 
conceptions of  the nature and reach of Parliamentary sovereignty are so hotly contested between 
political and legal, legislative and judicial, Parliament-centred and common-law-centred, 
therefore, is that these disagreements concern occupation of the narrow access route to the 
commanding heights of our  unwritten constitutional system. What is more, there is a self-
reinforcing intractability to the debate. As there is no Archimedean point beyond Parliamentary 
sovereignty where the debate over the meaning of Parliamentary sovereignty can be definitively 
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resolved, the contest threatens to become perpetual.
56
 And as some parties, the various 
institutional parties in particular, who argue for this or that understanding of Parliamentary 
sovereignty have both an authoritative presence in the negotiation and a significant stake in the 
outcome –  that is to say, they are seeking to declare the rules of the very game in which they are 
active players  -   this further militates against settlement.   
In turn, this is connected to a third limiting tendency associated with the centrality of 
Parliamentary sovereignty. The focus on the past and its struggles rather than the future that is so 
characteristic of  our leading narratives` of constitutionalism also stems from the difficulty of 
thinking or acting beyond Parliamentary supremacy as the apex of authority. Just as there is no 
likelihood of easy resolution of disputes over the provenance, status, meaning and extent of 
Parliamentary sovereignty, so too the resilience of the doctrine militates against the adoption of 
the kind of written constitutional prospectus enjoyed by virtually all other states. There is little 
political will to depart from a framework which has become so embedded within our political 
heritage and which, in its open-ended empowerment of the government of the day, suits the 
beliefs and the interests of  the key actors on whom any  initiative to change would depend. Nor, 
especially in an age where the territorial integrity of the polity is under challenge from nationalist 
quarters, would the prospects be promising of a successful conclusion if any broader project of 
refounding and resettlement were to be attempted.
57
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 The absence of a viable alternative horizon inevitably redirects our constitutional 
visionaries and engineers backwards. If there can be no constitutional resource to draw upon in 
determining and finessing the ground-rules for steering constitutional adjustment and reform 
other than the resource we already possess, then that resource has to be mined exhaustively for 
the nuggets of meaning and practice which support our preferred reading.  Ironically, therefore, 
despite its very different origins and centre of institutional gravity, and despite its much more 
permissive consequences in terms of legislative policy, the root idea of Parliamentary 
sovereignty, with its venerable standing and self-reproductive tendencies, ends up performing the 
same kind of symbolic function as some of the older written Constitutions, most notably the 
United States Constitution. Over time, its foundational precepts, just like their foundational texts, 
come to assume an almost sacred quality and so to supply a non-negotiable point of departure for 
anyone who wants to be taken seriously in the constitutional conversation.  
It is certainly the case, we may conclude, that the sovereignty frame is still entrenched 
within the deep structure of British constitutionalism, even for those who might be critical about 
its scope or absolute quality.  Yet the reduction of that frame to the particular and partial claim of 
Parliamentary sovereignty adds a peculiar texture to our constitutional debate. Sovereignty does 
indeed remain very much ‘in perspective’ in the United Kingdom today, but it is often through a 
rather narrow focus. 
  
